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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. Is the trial court's refusal to find, after argument, 
whether the house payments made by the Appellant are alimony or a 
property settlement, error, which requires the Supreme Court to 
make a finding as to the character of this payment? 
B. If the payment is characterized as alimony, is the 
Plaintiff's full time career employment after the time of the 
Decree a substantial enough change in circumstances to warrant 
terminating the payment? 
C. If the house payment requirement is characterized 
as a property settlement, should it be suspended due to lack of 
consideration, which makes the payment inequitable? 
D. Does the trial court have a duty to see that all 
agreements by the parties to a divorce are equitable whether or 
not the parties are represented by counsel, and should the court 
have discovered whatever facts are necessary to make such a 
determination? 
E. Does the trial court have a duty to remedy an 
inequitable agreement, especially when the inequity is made more 
severe due to a change in circumstances, once a party to it has 
petitioned the Court for relief, or to at least modify the 
inequitable portion of the agreement in such a way as to remedy 
the inequity with the least adverse impact on the position of the 
other party? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal by the defendant, John Kerschner from 
an order denying his Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce. 
B. Course of the Proceedings. 
The parties were divorced on May 20, 1983. The 
Defendant filed a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce which was 
heard October 3, 1984 before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby. 
C. Disposition in the District Court. 
The Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, of the,Second Judicial 
District ruling from the bench October 3, 1984, the Defendant's 
Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce was denied, but the 
Court would not find whether the payment was alimony or a 
property settlement, and denied the Petition on both grounds. 
Accordingly, no written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
were entered, since the matter had been argued and was not 
decided. 
D. Statement of Material Facts. 
The Parties were divorced on May 20, 1983. The Decree 
of Divorce was entered by consent of the parties, with the 
Defendant/Appellant husband (hereinafter Defendant) ordered to 
pay the sum of $200.00 per child per month as child support, for 
a total of $600.00 per month. The Defendant was also ordered in 
paragraph 7 of the Decree (Appendix A) to pay the house payment 
on the marital residence in the sum of $276.00 per month until 
the Plaintiff/Respondent wife (hereinafter Plaintiff) remarries, 
cohabits with another adult male, no longer uses the premises as 
her principal place of residence, the youngest child of the 
parties reaches age 18, or the home is sold, whichever comes 
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first. However, the equity in the home was divided at the time 
of the Decree, with Defendant to receive the sum of $12,340.00 
upon the occurrence of one of the above contingencies. The first 
certain contingency is the date the youngest child of the parties 
reaches age 18, which will be in 11 years. If the Defendant 
should pay the house payment until that time he will have paid 
approximately $36,000.00 to the Plaintiff, for which he receives 
no interest, equity, or other offset of any kind. The Defendant 
paid temporary child support and alimony to the Plaintiff prior 
to the divorce and paid the house payment for 13 months before he 
petitioned the Court to modify the Decree of Divorce. Since the 
parties' divorce in June of 1983 the Plaintiff has changed from 
an unemployed housewife to an employed teacher for nine months of 
the year, complete with pension and other benefits, which 
resulted in an increase in her income from $876.00 per month 
(child support and alimony), to approximately $1876.00 per month, 
which is based upon her receiving her salary for 12 months of the 
year and does not include her benefits , which increase her base 
salary by approximately 30%. Based upon this change of 
circumstances, along with the Defendant's remarriage to a woman 
with children of her own from a prior marriage and the attendant 
costs thereto, the Defendant petitioned the trial court for a 
modification of his Decree of Divorce, requesting relief from the 
obligation to pay the payment on the house, or in the alternative 
to modify the terms of the requirement so that he would receive 
some offset, such as all or part of the equity built up during 
the time he pays the payment, plus interest on the outstanding 
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balance of his share of the equity. All of his requests on that 
issue were denied. There were other issues which were dealt with 
in the Petition which are not the subject of this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. Counsel for Defendant argued that the requirement 
that he pay the Plaintiff's house payment in the sum of $276.00 
per month, although not designated as such, was alimony because 
it was not a sum certain and as such, could be modified upon a 
showing of a change in the circumstances of the parties. Counsel 
for Plaintiff argued that said requirement was a property 
settlement and as such could not be modified. The trial court, 
after hearing this argument, would not decide the nature of the 
payment, which was error. As a result, the Defendant does not 
know if he can, in the future, petition the Court again, or 
whether this appeal is his last recourse. If a trial Court fails 
or refuses to decide an issue presented and argued before it, 
especially in matters of equity, the Supreme Court has the power 
to decide that issue, and to issue appropriate findings of fact 
and conclusions of law in accordance with the decision of the 
Supreme Court. 
B. The house payment requirement is alimony and is 
modifiable by the Defendant's showing of a substantial change in 
circumstances. At the time of the divorce, the Plaintiff was an 
unemployed housewife with a teaching certificate and an income of 
$876.00 per month. Thirteen months later she had completed one 
full year of teaching, and had permanent employment as such, 
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complete with benefits and a twelve month income of approximately 
$1,000.00 per month, bringing her total monthly income to 
approximately $1876.00 per month, not including benefits. Since 
her obtaining employment more than doubled her income, the 
Defendant claims that this qualifies as a substantial change in 
Plaintiff's circumstances which would warrant a change in his 
obligations to the Plaintiff. 
C. If the payment requirement is a property settlement, 
it should be suspended because it has no consideration, and 
as a result is patently inequitable. In order for a payment to 
be classified as a property settlement in a Decree of Divorce, it 
must be paid to compensate the party receiving the payment for 
real or personal property retained by the paying party and must 
be a sum certain which is not terminable on certain contingencies 
as required in Fletcher v^ Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980). 
The essence of this arrangement is the requirement that the 
paying party receive something for his payments and pay a certain 
sum of money for those items. In this case, the marital property 
was equitably divided without this payment being considered, and 
as a result the Defendant is receiving nothing for his payment. 
This arrangement is unfair, and the trial court found that it is 
"unusual"(T 37). The equitable powers of the trial court enable 
it, and require it to modify inequitable provisions of its 
decrees, and the trial court should have suspended the 
requirement that the Defendant pay the Plaintiff's house payment. 
D. The trial court has a duty to discover whatever 
facts are necessary to determine whether or not an agreement by 
t h e p a r t i e s t o a d i v o r c e i s e q u i t a b l e , w h e t h e r or no t t h e p a r t i e s 
a r e r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l . I n t h i s c a s e , h o w e v e r , t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t h e l d t h a t "The Cour t ha s an o b l i g a t i o n t o l e t them a g r e e t o 
w h a t t h e y w a n t t o a g r e e t o " (T 3 8 ) , and t h a t " t h e C o u r t w o u l d 
have c h a l l e n g e d i t a t t h e t i m e or a t l e a s t made i t c l e a r t o t h e 
p a r t i e s a s t o wha t you a r e d o i n g " b u t f o r b o t h p a r t i e s b e i n g 
r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l (T 3 8 ) . T h i s i s e r r o r i n a c o u r t of 
e q u i t y . The C o u r t ' s d u t y i s t o s e e t h a t t h e a g r e e m e n t s a r e 
e q u i t a b l e , no t t o r e l y on c o u n s e l t o do so . I f t h e f a c t s a r e no t 
o b v i o u s a s t o why t h e p a r t i e s h a v e a g r e e d t o a s p e c i f i c 
p r o v i s i o n , t h e n t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s i n a p o s i t i o n t o a s c e r t a i n 
them, and h a s a d u t y t o do so . In t h i s c a s e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t had 
a d u t y t o a s c e r t a i n why t h e D e f e n d a n t was a g r e e i n g t o pay t h e 
house payment , and t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r he u n d e r s t o o d t h e g r e a t 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h i s payment would c o n t i n u e for many y e a r s . Only 
when t h e t r i a l c o u r t has done t h a t can i t h o l d t h e Defendant t o 
h i s ag reemen t now. As a r e s u l t of t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o 
d e t e r m i n e t h e f a c t s beh ind t h e ag reemen t d e s p i t e i t s conce rn a t 
t h e t i m e t h e s t i p u l a t i o n was h e a r d , t h e same t r i a l c o u r t now h a s 
a d u t y t o m o d i f y t h e D e c r e e t o r e m e d y t h e i n e q u i t y of t h e 
a g r e e m e n t , and i t was m a n i f e s t i n j u s t i c e fo r t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o 
r e f u s e t o do so . 
E. The t r i a l c o u r t has a du ty t o modify any i n e q u i t a b l e 
p o r t i o n of a Decree of D ivo rce , w h e t h e r t h a t i n e q u i t y i s caused 
by a c h a n g e of c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e p a r t i e s o r w h e t h e r t h e 
a g r e e m e n t was i n e q u i t a b l e from i t s i n c e p t i o n , once t h e t r i a l 
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court realizes that the agreement is indeed unfair. In this case 
the trial court found the agreement to be "unusual" which is 
tantamount to finding that the agreement is unfair, since it is 
"unusual" for a person to be required to pay for something, only 
to receive nothing for it. The Defendant also asked the trial 
court in lieu of removing the payment entirely, to grant him all 
or part of the remaining house equity, and to give him interest 
on that equity. This modification would not have changed the 
daily living condition of the Plaintiff and the children, and 
would have allowed the Defendant to receive something, albeit in 
the future, for his payment. The trial court, however, refused 
even this less intrusive modification, and in light of the 
conclusion that the agreement is "unusual" it was error for the 
Court to refuse to do so. 
x 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO FIND, AFTER ARGUMENT, 
WHETHER THE HOUSE PAYMENT MADE BY DEFENDANT TO PLAINTIFF IS 
ALIMONY OR PROPERTY SETTLEMENT IS ERROR AND REQUIRES THE SUPREME 
COURT TO MAKE A FINDING AS TO THE CHARACTER OF THIS PAYMENT. 
The Defendant's Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce 
asked the trial court, among other things, to determine whether 
the house payment requirement, which is the subject of this 
appeal, should be characterized as a property settlement or 
alimony. The Decree is silent as to the classification of the 
payment, and the classification bears greatly on the future 
modiflability of the payment. Counsel agree that if the payment 
is alimony then the Defendant could petition the Court for its 
modification again at a later date if circumstances warrant, even 
if his appeal is otherwise denied. If the payment is classified 
as a property settlement and not modified by the Supreme Court as 
a result of this appeal, the Defendant will be barred from 
attempting to modify it at a later date. This difference was an 
important issue to the parties, and despite vociferous argument 
by Counsel, the trial court refused to determine the 
classification of the payment. In fact, the trial court's 
findings are so inconclusive that it was impossible for Counsel 
to draft findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding this 
hearing, as they would never agree on the classification and the 
trial court gave them no guidance, let alone a decision. The 
trial court stated that "Defense counsel, of course, is saying 
it's in the nature of alimony. It sure sounds like it, and yet 
the stipulation clearly was that there is no alimony to be paid. 
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Plaintiff's counsel is saying it's obviously property settlement. 
This is not obvious to me that it's property settlement." (T 38) 
"It looks like it's probably in lieu of alimony and yet, agreed 
there is no such thing as alimony. It could be property 
settlement." (T40) 
The Court then makes its final ruling, and states: "So I 
am going to hold the—unusual as it is, the terms as it is, even 
though it's there without any offsetting equity in the house even 
though it says there's no alimony" (T 40). 
This ruling leaves Counsel for the parties in an 
impossible stalemate and no findings of fact or conclusions of 
law were filed as a result. Whenever a trial court leaves the 
parties in such a position, it is reasonable for the parties to 
appeal to the Supreme Court to decide the issue, especially in 
matters of equity, and to ask the Supreme Court to issue findings 
and conclusions in accordance with the decision of the Supreme 
Court. 
B. THE HOUSE PAYMENT MADE BY THE DEFENDANT IS ALIMONY 
AND SHOULD BE TERMINATED, SINCE THE PLAINTIFF'S OBTAINING FULL 
TIME CAREER EMPLOYMENT AFTER THE TIME OF THE DECREE IS A 
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES. 
This Court in Fletcher v^ Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1221 (Utah 
1980) stated that "the alimony awarded in this action cannot be 
deemed in the nature of a property settlement, for it is not a 
sum certain but is terminable on certain contingencies." In this 
case, the house payment requirement is not a sum certain and 
terminates when the last child reaches age 18, the plaintiff 
remarries or cohabits with an adult male, the home is no longer 
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used as her principal place of residence, or when the house is 
sold, whichever comes first. The first reliable contingency, the 
last child reaching age IS, will occur in approximately 11 years. 
However, any of the other contingencies could occur before that 
time, so the Plaintiff has no idea the final amount that the 
Defendant will pay to her* Because of this uncertainty, this 
payment must be classified as alimony, and cannot be a property 
settlement. 
At the time of the parties* divorce, the Plaintiff was 
an unemployed housewife with a teaching certificate and an income 
of $876.00 per month which represented child support and the 
house payment paid by the Defendadnt. Thirteen months later she 
had completed one full year of teaching, and had permanent 
employment as such, complete with benefits and a twelve month 
income- of approximately $1,000,00 per month, bringing her total 
cash monthly income to approximately $1876.00 per month, not 
counting her benefits which amount to an increase in her teaching 
income of approximately 30%. 
Since Plaintiff's obtaining employment more than 
doubled her income, The Defendant claims that this qualifies as a 
substantial change in her circumstances which would warrant a 
change in the Defendant's obligations to the Plaintiff. 
The standards used in fixing an alimony award are: 
1. the financial conditions and needs of the wife; 
2. the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient 
income for herself; 
3. the ability of the husband to provide support. 
In this case the parties were married for twelve years 
but the Plaintiff did have her teaching certificate and as a 
result had marketable skills. Applying the above-stated standard, 
her unemployed status at the time of the decree would have 
required a reasonable sum of alimony for a time, but the 
prospects for the Plaintiff to provide a sufficient income for 
herself were excellent and alimony should terminate when those 
prospects have been realized. 
The above-stated standards should also be applied when 
determining whether an alimony award in a Decree of Divorce 
should be modified. Plaintiff has now proven that she is able to 
produce a sufficient income for herself, but she is still in need 
of child support to help with the support of the children, which 
is $600.00 per month for three children and which the Defendant 
does not dispute. Her general financial condition is good, and 
is better than at the time of the Decree. The ability of the 
Defendant to provide support has been diminished by his 
remarriage to a woman who has children of her own, which can 
result in as many as seven children residing in the Defendant's 
home on his visitation weekends. The Defendant is making 
only $1,000.00 per year more than he was three years ago (T 3). 
The most substantial change in circumstances remains the 
Plaintiff's employment which more than doubled her income. Not 
only that, her job provides a retirement plan, medical insurance, 
and other benefits which will put her in a similar, if not better 
financial position than the Defendant in her later years. 
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Accordingly, the Defendant should be relieved of the requirement 
that he pay the Plaintiff's house payment of $276.00 per month 
due to her substantial change in circumstances. 
This Court held in Haslam v^_ Haslam, 657 P.2d 757 (Utah 
1982) that there had been a substantial change in circumstances 
where Mrs. Haslam had obtained employment, experienced a 
substantial increase in income and had accumulated some savings 
and Mr. Haslam's income had not increased since the time of the 
divorce. In that case the parties were married for 21 years and 
had been divorced for 17 years. The financial situation of the 
parties to this appeal is similar, except that both parties were 
much younger at the time of the divorce and were not married for 
nearly so long. 
The Court in Has].aiii held that "the change in 
circumstances required to justify a modification of a divorce 
decree varies with the type of modification sought" and also 
held that 
"With respect to modifying alimony, this Court has 
recently stated that provisions in the original decree 
of divorce granting alimony, child support, and the 
like must be readily susceptible to alteration at a 
later date, as the needs which such provisions were 
designed to fill are subject to rapid and unpredictable 
change." [Citatiton deleted] 
Id., at 758. In this case the Plaintiff's income has more than 
doubled since the time of the Decree, she has substantial 
retirement and other job benefits, and the Defendant's income has 
not substantially increased, but his obligations have increased. 
As a result, the Defendant should relieved of the obligation to 
pay the Plaintiff's house payment. 
C. THE PAYMENT MADE BY THE DEFENDANT, IF A PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT, SHOULD BE SUSPENDED SINCE IT IS PATENTLY INEQUITABLE, 
HAS NO CONSIDERATION, AND WAS FOUND TO BE "UNUSUAL" BY THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
In order for a cash payment to be classified as a 
property settlement rather than alimony in a decree of divorce, it 
must be paid to the other party as compensation for real or 
personal property retained by the paying party and must be a sum 
certain Fletcher v^ Fletcher 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980). In this 
case the personal and real property of the parties was equitably 
divided between them without any payment required. All marital 
property is disclosed in the decree, and consists of the 
Plaintiff present residence, various cars and household 
furniture. There has never been any evidence presented to 
indicate that there was other property retained by the Defendant 
for which he was paying the Plaintiff. Even the equity in the 
marital residence was divided and reduced to a sum certain of 
$12,340.00 to be paid upon various contingencies. A requirement 
that the Defendant pay the Plaintiff the sum of $36,000.00 over 
the next 11 years without any offset or consideration is patently 
inequitable. Even the trial court found the payment to be 
"unusual" (T 37). 
This Court in Davis v. Davis 655 P.2d 672 (Utah 1982) 
determined that such a requirement was inequitable under 
practically idential facts, finding that 
". . .the trial court upset the equity of that division 
by requiring the defendant to make a further 
substantial investment in the property without any 
corresponding benefit to him. . .The defendant will be 
required to make post decree payments nearly double 
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the equity awarded to him. This was unfair to him and 
weighted the division of the property heavily in the 
plaintiff's favor. Fairness dictates that he should 
realize something out of the increased equity which 
will result from his providing the funds to retire 
the second mortgage. [Citation omitted] 
Id., at 673. In Davis the defendant was ordered to pay the 
second mortgage on the marital residence in lieu of alimony/ and 
his share of the house equity was determined at the time of the 
divorce. In the present case, the Defendant will pay $36,000.00 
to the Plaintiff by the time the last child reaches age 18 which 
is three times the $12,340.00 in house equity awarded to him in 
the decree. Such an agreement was found by this Court to be 
inequitable in Davis and it is inequitable in the present case as 
well. 
The equitable powers of the trial court enable it, and 
require it to modify inequitable provisions of its decrees, and 
the trial court should have relieved the Defendant from the 
requirement that he pay the Plaintiff's house payment, and it was 
an abuse of discretion for it to fail to do so. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT HAS A DUTY TO SEE THAT ALL 
AGREEMENT S BY THE PARTIES TO A DIVORCE ARE EQUITABLE WHETHER OR 
NOT THE PARTIES ARE REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AND TO DISCOVER 
WHATEVER FACTS ARE NECESSARY TO MAKE SUCH A DETERMINATION. 
The trial court, especially in equitable matters, has a 
duty to determine whether or not agreements between the parties 
to a divorce are equitable. The fact that one or both of the 
parties is represented by counsel does not alter the duty of the 
court. In this case, however, after the Defendant petitioned the 
trial court to modify the decree of divorce, the trial court held 
that "the Court has an obligation to let them agree to what they 
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want to agree to" (T 38). "The Court would have challenged it at 
the time or at least made it clear to the parties as to what you 
are doing" but for both parties being represnted by counsel (T 
38). The trial court's duty is to see that the agreements are 
equitable, not to rely on counsel to do so. If the trial court 
has any suspicion as to the inequitability of any provision of 
the agreement, the trial court has a duty to ascertain whatever 
facts are necessary to satisfy itself that the provision is fair. 
The trial court has the power to change any part of an agreement 
between parties to a divorce should the it be convinced that it 
was inequitable. In this case, the trial court had a duty to 
ascertain why the Defendant was agreeing to pay the house payment 
when the equity was already divided, and to determine whether he 
understood the great possibility that this payment could continue 
for many years, possibly more years than a straightforward 
alimony payment. Only when the trial court had made those 
determinations could it now hold the Defendant to his agreement. 
The trial court's failure to determine the facts behind the 
original agreement was error and now requires that same court, in 
the interests of justice, to modify the decree of divorce to 
remedy the inequity, especially in light of its increased 
unfairness due to the Plaintiff's full-time employment. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT HAS A DUTY, ONCE A PARTY TO AN 
INEQUITABLE AGREEMENT HAS PETITIONED THE TRIAL COURT FOR RELIEF, 
TO GRANT THAT RELIEF OR TO MODIFY THE INEQUITABLE PORTION OF THE 
AGREEMENT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO REMEDY THE INEQUITY WITH THE LEAST 
ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE POSITON OF THE OTHER PARTY. 
In this case, the trial court found the requirement 
8 
that the Defendant pay the Plaintiff's house payment to be 
"unusual" and also stated that had the Defendant not been 
represented by Counsel that the trial court "would have 
challenged it at the time or at least made it clear to the 
parties as to what you are doing" (T 37, 38). This is tantamount 
to a finding that the agreement is inequitable, and accordingly 
the Defendant should be relieved of further payments on the 
Plaintiff's house. 
However, there is no evidence of any wrongdoing on 
the Plaintiff's part, and in light of that the trial court could 
have found that eliminating the payment entirely would result in 
hardship upon her. If that were the case, the court then had a 
duty to at least modify the decree in such a way as to remedy the 
inequity while affecting the Plaintiff as little as possible. The 
Defendant reasonably requested the court, in lieu of removing the 
payment entirely, to allow him to keep all or part of the house 
equity accrued at the time the last child reaches age IS, the 
house is sold, or some other contingency sooner in time. John 
also asked for interest on the unpaid balance, but essentially he 
requested the trial court to rectify the problem, and indicated 
that he would be amenable to a flexilble decision that gave the 
Defendant compensation for his payment even if the trial court 
could not eliminate it entirely. This the trial court refused to 
do, and in light of the facts and circumstances of the parties, 
was error. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant petitioned the trial court in this 
S 
matter for a modification of his divorce decree. The trial court 
refused to decide whether the requirement that the Defendant pay 
the Plaintiff's house payment was a property settlement rather 
than alimony. It them decided that it would not modify the 
decree, despite the Plaintiff's full-time employment following 
the divorce which more than doubled her income, and despite the 
trial court's finding that the payment was "unusual". As a 
result, the trial court has erred in failing to decide a major 
question asked of it, in failing to modify the divorce decree of 
the parties despite a substantial change in the circumstances of 
the parties, in failing to determine whether the stipulation of 
the parties was equitable in the first place, and upon 
determining that it was "unusual", the trial court has erred in 
refusing to modify the decree in any way. As a result, the 
Supreme Court is in a position to modify the decree to remove 
the Defendant's responsibility for the Plaintiff's house payment 
or otherwise modify the divorce decree to remedy the inequity 
presently contained therein, to determine whether the payment is 
alimony or a property settlement, and to make findings of fact 
and conclusions of law in accordance with its decision. 
Respectfully submitted this 5^ day of May, 1985. 
BY y^ cm^ 
Zfkne Allen 
Attorney for Appellant 
JA-10/KERS/BRF 
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RONALD W. PERKINS 
VLAHOS, PERKINS & SHARP 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Legal Forum Building 
24 47 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2464 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DIANA KERSCHNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
JOHN H. KERSCHNER, 
Defendant. 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 1-3273-5 
3000 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the 
23th day of February, 1983, before the Honorable Douglas L. 
Cornaby, one of the Judges of the above entitled Court, sitting 
without a jury, and the plaintiff being personally present 
3.116. represented by hei dttOMie^ ^  Ronald W. ire-LKiris. a.ud the 
defendant being personally present and represented by his attor-
ney, Walker E. Juiderson, and the parties having entered into 
an oral stipulation governing their respective property rights, 
custody, support, alimony, attorney's fees, and all other kindred 
rights, and the plaintiff having been sworn and testified in 
open Court, and the Court having approved the oral stipulation 
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of the parties and being fully cognizant of all matters herein, 
and the Court having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, separately stated in writing, HOW THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That the plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce 
from the defendant, same to become final on May 20, 19 33, provid-
ed same is signed and filed with the Court prior to such date. 
2. That the plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and 
control of the three minor children of the parties, subject 
to the defendant's reasonable rights of visitation at reasonable 
times and places. 
3. That the plaintiff is awarded the sum of $200.00 per 
month per child as and for child support for three minor children. 
4. That the plaintiff shall retain as her personal property 
the household furniture and furnishings, the 1976 Volare automobile, 
as well as her personal belongings and effects, 
5. That the defendant shall retain as his sole property 
the 197 9 Ford Courier, the tent trailer, the motorcycle, boat, 
motor, all interest in defendant's IRA account, as well as 
his personal belongings and effects. 
-3-
6. That the plaintiff shall retain the marital home and 
real property located at 55 South 4th West, Kaysville, Davis 
County, State of Utah, subject to a lien in favor of the defen-* 
dant in the sum of $12,340.00, which shall become due and payable 
upon the following conditions:' 
a. Plaintiff should remarry, or 
b. That no other adult male lives in the home, or 
c. She should no longer use the premises as her prin-
cipal place of'residence, or 
d. The youngest child of the parties reaches the 
age of majority, or 
e. The home be sold by the parties , whichever of 
the above conditions should occur first. 
7* That the defendant shall pay the sum of $276*00 to 
United Savings & Loan as and for the house payment, until such 
time as any of the conditions referred to in paragraph six (6) 
should occur, whichever occurs first, but in no event shall 
defendant be required **o p-y more than ^9^6 00 per month to 
United Savings & Loan relative to such obligation, 
8. That the plaintiff shall be entitled to retain the 
1982 income tax return in the approximate sum of $2,020.00, 
and a check from the Terkelson Company, 
a. Plaintiff shall pay all utilities at the home and 
maintain the home, building and premises in good condition and 
repair. 
-4-
9. That the parties shall each be entitled to retain 
one-half the 1932 Utah State income tax refund and jointly pay taxes 
10. That the defendant shall maintain health, accident 
and dental insurance on the minor children of the parties so 
long as same is available through any place of employment, 
and should future orthodontic expenses arise with respect to 
the minor children, the plaintiff and defendant shall each' 
be responsible for one-half of all sums not paid by insurance. 
11. That there'presently exists a savings account in the 
approximate sum of $1,190.00, which account is in the names 
of the parties three minor children, and the plaintiff and 
the defendants1 names shall also be joined as a party to such 
account, and such account shall be used for the benefit of 
the three minor children upon mutual consent for its use by 
the plaintiff and defendant. 
12. That the plaintiff waives her right to alimony, past, 
present or future. 
13 • That 5.t is proposed for the year 1983. that" the defendant 
shall claim two of the parties minor children for income tax 
purposes, and the plaintiff shall claim one minor child for 
income tax purposes, and such procedure being alternated every 
year* and it also being proposed that such tax exemption claims 
may be altered by the mutual agreement of the plaintiff and 
the defendant in any year the parties desire to alter the exemp-
tion claims. 
-5-
14. That the defendant shall pay'to the plaintiff the 
sum of $380.00 attorney's fees and costs in this action. 
DATED this Jj( day of &&&(, 1983. 
BY THE COURT: 
'^^J^.^J^ (T\(J^^L --
bOUGLAS L. ^ ftRNABY, 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
WALKER E. ANDERSON, 
Attorney for Defendant 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DAVIS 
I THE UNDERSIGNED. CLERK OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH DO HEREBY CER-
TIFY THAT THE ANNEXED AND FOREGOING IS A TRUE 
AND FULL COPY OF AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON 
PILE IN MY OFFICE AS SUCH CLERK. 
WITNESS MY H 
THIS. DAY-
SEAL OF SAID OFFICE^ 
R0DNEY W. WALKER, CLERK 
0 
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JANE ALLEN (Bar No. 45) 
At torney for Defendant 
261 East 300 South, Su i t e 150 
Sa l t Lake C i ty , Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-1300 
FILED IH CLERK'S OFFICF DAVIS COUNTY. UTAH 
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 DEPUTY CLLKK 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
M DIANA KERSCHNER, 
* Plaintiff, 
J 
• vs. 
JOHN H. KERSCHNER, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
PETITION TO MODIFY 
Civil No. 1-32735 
This matter came on for hearing on the 3rd day of October, 
1984 before the Honorable Douglas L Cornaby. The Plaintiff was 
present with her counsel, C. Gerald Parker, Esq. The Defendant was 
present with his counsel, Jane Allen, Esq. After hearing testimony 
and argument, the Court makes the following Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The Decree of Divorce shall be modified to eliminate 
paragraph 13 of the Decree, with the tax deduction of the parties 
in regard to the minor children to be governed by the rule of the 
IRS. 
2. Defendant's request that he be relieved of the 
obligation to pay the house payment for the house presently 
occupied by the Plaintiff is hereby denied. 
3. That paragraph 10 of the Decree of Divorce regarding 
the maintenance of health, accident, and dental insurance on the 
minor children shall remain unchanged. 
4. Defendant's request that the equity in the marital 
residence be redetermined is hereby denied. 
5. The defendant may talk to the children on the tele-
phone without interference from the Plaintiff so long as such 
calls are at reasonable times and duration. 
6. The parties are mutually restrained from harassing 
the other. 
7. Each party shall bear their own attorney's fees and 
costs. 
8. All other provisions of the Decree of Divorce not 
herein amended shall remain in full force and effect. 
DATED this J day of _£)c ^ ^ Js^ 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
^=±±JL i^^ bi^ /ii) Cornaby 
District Court Judge 
,£^Wc >6// 
Approved as to form and 
content: 
C. Gerald Parker 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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2 
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5 
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9 
10 
11 
12 
them but we submit, your Honor, that under the circumstances, 
it's appropriate and proper for the decree to remain as it is 
at the present time. 
THE COURT: Do you want one-minute rebuttal? 
MS. ALLEN: I just think it's clear, in looking at 
this, that at best this particular provision for ongoing pay-
ments is a gray area. It may not be alimony. 
THE COURT: Cray, meaning what? 
MS. ALLEN: Gray meaning it's not called alimony, but 
it's not called property settlement. It's not called anything 
and because of that the Court can probably quite reasonably 
apply his equitable powers to see that something that is unfair 
131 does not continue for the next 10 or 12 years while he pays off 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
the house and only get $12,000 in equity even though he pays all) 
the payments for all of the years on the house and since she 
has already been awarded her half of the equity at the time of 
the decree to keep it, obviously, the house was split. 
She became quite immediately employed. Usually alimony is 
just to put the spouse who did not work, who bore the children, 
back on her feet. She is on her feet just fine and it seems 
that it's just only the fair thing to do in this case is to 
allow him not to have to pay this payment any more. 
THE COURT: Thank you. I will talk about the house 
payment first. The Court doesn!t know why it's there. It's a 
very unusual provision, but parties, one represented or whether 
37 
1 or not they are represented by counsel, have a right to 
2 stipulate and agree to what, they want to stipulate to on their 
3 agreements and unless there's something patently unfair about 
4 it, the Court has an obligation to let them agree to what they 
5 | want to agree to. 
6 If that same thing had been presented to the Court without 
7 the defendant being represented by competent counsel, the Court 
8 | probably would have challenged it at the time or at least made 
9 it clear to the parties as to what you are doing. Both parties 
10 were represented by competent counsel. Why in the world they 
11 chose to do what they did, certainly I don't know at this point 
12) I may never know. Defense counsel, of course, is saying it's 
13 in the nature of alimony. It sure sounds like it, and yet, the 
14 stipulation clearly was that there is no alimony to be paid. 
15j Plaintiff's counsel is saying it's obviously property 
16 settlement. This is not obvious to me that it's property 
17 settlement. What is appears to the Court to be is that the 
18 plaintiff was entitled to some alimony because of the length 
19 of the time of their marriage and the defendant was adamantly 
2° refusing to pay any alimony but he was agreeing for the sake of 
21 the children to do something different, which is, I will pay the 
22 house payment. That helps the kids. It doesn't help me any but 
2 3 it helps my children. At the same time I will pay child support 
24 but I won't pay alimony. That sounds to the Court like what 
25 occurred but I can't say that's what occurred. The only way J 
38 
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1 that that can be done and mind you, I didn't hear the trial. 
2 { I only heard a stipulation between the parties and so they 
3 hammered out all of the details and they handed it to the 
4 Court and I listened to it and I say, will you agree to it and 
5 they say, will you agree to it and I said, yeah, I will agree 
5 and I asked each of the parties if they will agree to it or if 
7 that's really their agreement and if they say yes then we pro-
8 ceed on that basis and that's what occurred in this case. 
9 The reporting clerk made rather detailed notes as to what 
10 was agreed on. So, as you each look at the decree to see what 
11 it says I keep watching that minute entry to see the decree 
12 matches the minute entry and the decree matches the minute entr 
13 It does say what the minute entry says they agreed to. I don't 
141 know if the defendant had some retirement that was being offset 
15 and this is a consideration. I don't know if they had some 
16 other property that had some value that he was going to keep 
17 that this was going to offset to. I didn't know then and I 
18 don't know now and I can't jump to a conclusion that it's 
19 J alimony and it should be terminated. 
2 0
 I have to say that if it were alimony there has been no 
21 showing that there is any change that would—The sheer making 
22 of $15,100 for nine months a year is not in and of itself enough 
23 J to stop alimony. The fact that the defendant remarries isn't 
241 enough by itself or with the fact of tne plaintiff having a good 
25| salary. I suppose good always is in quotes because none of us 
39 
sitting here would call $15,100 a good salary. 
The Court doesn't know why the provision was put there. 
It's odd to put it until the youngest is 18. It makes it sound 
like some additional child support. It looks like it's probabl^ 
in lieu of alimony and yet, agreed there is no such thing as 
alimony. It could be property settlement. Over a term of 
11 years which is the approximate period of time until that 
youngest child reaches 18, we are talking about $36,000. We 
are talking about a very significant sum of money and yet, if 
the parties want to agree on it and they apparently did, at 
this time, it isn't like the defendant didn't know what he was 
doing. He may have thought about it the day after or the week 
after and said, boy, what did I do, but sometime approximately-j 
well, shortly less than two months he .puts his own signature to 
the document drawn by his attorney. 
At least it may not have been drawn—I guess by the plain-
tiff's attorney and agreed to by the defense attorney and as 
counsel said, very unusual because he even had the defendant 
sign it, which is unusual, but it tells me that he saw it and 
undoubtedly considered it after it was drawn, not only on 
strictly the day of the hearing. 
So, I am going to hold the--unusual as it is, the terms as 
it is, even though it's there without any offsetting equity in 
the house even though it says there's no alimony. It appears 
to be two intelligent people agreeing and knowing what they 
40 
1 are agreeing to. Can't tell you why, but the decree was there 
2 and it will remain the same. Parties agree to let the IRS de-
3 cide who is entitled to claim the children as deductions and 
4 that can be amended to show that. 
5 With regard to visitation. Mr. Kerschner, if you cannot 
6 fulfill your visitation you have no right to ask the plaintiff 
7 to change her time with the children to match yours. Now, you 
8 can ask her, but you have no right to demand it. On the other-
9 hand, Mrs. Kerschner, if he asks you if you agree, then you are 
10 bound by it. You cannot change. I mean, it's true it doesn't 
11 say it in the decree, but we expect parents to, when they 
12 mutually agree on something, they will be bound by it. 
13 I don't know whether you agree to it or not, but if you 
141 agree to a change then you will want to live up to your word. 
15 Now, with regard to the phone visitation. The children 
16 ought to have phone visitation and it ought to be without any 
17 eavesdropping from either party. I don't know if it's occuring, 
18 either. We spent very little time on it. Just say there ought 
19 to be those rights and they ought to be respected. 
20 With regard to the health and accident insurance, I think 
21 we have got that cleared up. The decree says that each party 
22 will pay one-half of all medical bills not covered by insurance. 
23 it doesn't make any difference, orthodonist or if it's an office 
24 call and it's not paid by insurance. The decree says one-half, 
25 so each pay one-half. While it's anticipated that only the 
41 
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gency has passed.5 It has been observed 
that the overall trend has been in the di-
rection of absoluteness rather than condi-
tionally with increasing weight apparently 
being given to the presumption against in-
testacy.6 
[3] Significantly, the testatrix did not 
make any alternative' disposition of her 
property if the asserted condition precedent 
of the second paragraph was not fulfilled. 
Since she devised nothing to her husband, 
his death had no significant impact on her 
overall testamentary disposition. 
"The fact that the testator made no 
express provision for forfeiture or gift 
over upon failure of the condition tends 
to show that he did not mean to impose a 
condition." 7 
This will, considered as a whole, shows a 
manifest intention of the testatrix to make 
an absolute will disposing of all of her prop-
erty. While it may be inexpertly drawn, it 
is sufficiently clear that she did not intend 
to die intestate, if her husband did not 
precede her in death. If a literal interpre-
tation of the second paragraph could be 
deemed to create an inconsistency with the 
plain intent of the testatrix as unmistak-
ably revealed in the remainder of the will, 
then those words should be disregarded.8 
Furthermore, testatrix clearly specified her 
intent and purpose to disinherit her six 
grandchildren, who were the children of her 
deceased son. It would be totally inconsist-
ent with this avowed objective to construe 
her will as showing an intent to die intes-
tate if the condition precedent failed and 
thus the grandchildren would inherit under 
5. In re Trager's Estate, 413 111. 364, 108 N.E.2d 
908, 910 (1952). 
6. 1 A.L.R.3d 1048, Anno: Determination 
Whether Will Is Absolute Or Conditional, Sec. 
3, p. 1052; also see 1 Page On Wills (Bowe-Par-
ker Revision) Sec. 9.8, p. 428. 
7. 5 Page On Wills (Bowe-Parker Revision) Sec. 
44.2, p. 400. 
the laws of intestate succession.9 Such a 
construction would produce an absurd re-
sult, clearly contrary to the intention of the 
testatrix as it is ascertained from the four 
corners of the will. 
Testatrix clearly intended her two daugh-
ters, Tess and Gloria, to be the distributees 
of all her property. This case is reversed 
and remanded to the trial court with di-
rections to proceed with the probate of the 
estate in accordance with this opinion. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS and 
HALL, JJ.} concur. 
STEWART, J., dissents. 
Margaret FLETCHER, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
William I. FLETCHER, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 16407. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 18, 1930. 
Husband appealed distribution of prop-
erty and custodial arrangements for minor 
9. See 4 Page On Wills (Bowe-Parker Revision) 
Sec. 30.17, p. 115, wherein it is stated: "If 
testator does not dispose of the whole of his 
estate by his last will and testament, and such 
will contains negative words of exclusion, the 
great majority of states hold that such negative 
words cannot prevent property from passing 
under the statutes of descent and distribution. 
8. Brasser v. Hutchison, 37 Colo.App. 528, 549 
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children in decree of divorce entered by 4. Divorce <s=»252.1, 286(8) 
Utah 1219 
First District Court, Cache County, Ted S. 
Perry, J. pro tern. The Supreme Court, 
Maughan, J., held that: (1) under statute 
governing disposition of property in divorce 
proceedings and rulings thereunder, equity 
of husband in home he purchased subse-
quent to wife's filing for divorce was prop-
erly considered marital asset subject to divi-
sion in divorce decree; (2) evidence was 
sufficient to support trial court's award of 
alimony in sum of $300 per month for 162 
months, provided that alimony was to ter-
minate upon either husband's death or 
wife's remarriage, as reasonable and appro-
priate sum for support and maintenance; 
(3) fact that father had inculcated older 
children with antagonistic attitudes toward 
mother and other evidence was sufficient to 
support trial court's award of custody of 
older children to father and of three young-
er children to mother; and (4) trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in decree requir-
ing two-week notice to arrange visitation of 
children by noncustodial parent. 
Affirmed. 
1. Divorce c=» 184(10) 
In divorce case, even though proceed-
ings are equitable and Supreme Court may 
review evidence, Supreme Court accords 
considerable deference to findings and 
judgment of trial court due to its advanta-
geous position. 
2. Divorce < ^ 184(5), 184(10) 
On appeal of divorce proceeding, Su-
preme Court will not disturb action of trial 
court unless evidence clearly preponderates 
to contrary, or trial court has abused its 
discretion, or misapplied principles of law. 
3. Divorce <s=> 252.2 
There is no fixed formula in divorce 
proceedings upon which to determine divi-
sion of properties; it is prerogative of court 
to make whatever disposition of property as 
it deems fair, equitable, and necessary for 
protection and welfare of mrtipQ 
In division of marital property in di-
vorce proceeding, trial judge has wide dis-
cretion, and his findings will not be dis-
turbed unless record indicates abuse there-
of. 
5. Divorce o=>308 
Court may not, under decree of divorce, 
unless child has incapacity or disability, or-
der transfer of property of either parent to 
children for purpose of creating estate for 
children's permanent benefit. 
6. Divorce <s=>282 
Theory urged by husband in objecting 
to valuation of his presently vested interest 
in certain retirement funds, which was not 
presented to trial court in divorce proceed--
ing, had to be deemed untimely when it was 
first claimed on appeal. 
7. Divorce c=>252.3(l) 
Under statute governing disposition of 
property in divorce proceedings and rulings 
thereunder, equity of husband in home he 
purchased subsequent to wife's filing for 
divorce was properly considered marital as-
set subject to division in divorce decree. 
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
8. Divorce c=>253(3) 
Marital estate is evaluated according to 
existing property interests at time marriage 
is terminated by decree of court. U.C.A. 
1953, 30-3-5 
9. Divorce c=>253(2) 
Evidence in divorce proceeding did not 
support conclusion that trial court abused 
its discretion in division of marital assets in 
divorce decree. 
10. Divorce c=>286(8) 
In reviewing division of marital proper-
ty on appeal from divorce judgment, award 
of alimony should not be included as mari-
tal asset which was distributed at time of 
divorce. 
11. Divorce c=»231, 240(2) 
Function of alimony is to provide sup-
1 2 2 0 Utah 615 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
dard of living she enjoyed during marriage 
and to prevent wife from becoming public 
charge; criteria considered in determining 
reasonable award of support include finan-
cial conditions and needs of wife, ability of 
wife to produce sufficient income for her-
self, and ability of husband to provide sup-
port. 
12. Divorce <s=>231 
Alimony awarded in divorce proceed-
ing, which was not sum certain but was 
terminable on certain contingencies, could 
not be deemed in nature of property settle-
ment. 
13. Divorce c=>240(3) 
Evidence in divorce proceeding was 
sufficient to sustain trial court's finding 
thai sum of $300 per month for 162 months 
awarded for alimony, provided that alimony 
was to terminate upon death of husband or 
wife's remarriage, was reasonable and ap-
propriate sum for support and maintenance. 
14. Divorce c=>224 
Supreme Court would not order that 
each party to divorce proceeding pay own 
attorney's fees where trial court had con-
ferred more favorable adjustment of re-
sources to husband in consideration of hus-
band's obligation to pay attorney's fees. 
15. Divorce c=*287 
Since, on appeal from divorce judg-
ment, there were number of factors to be 
considered in determining whether attor-
ney's fees should be awarded appellee for 
defending appeal, in addition to question as 
to which party prevailed on appeal, case 
would be remanded to trial court to deter-
mine whether award of attorney's fees 
should be made, and if so, amount thereof. 
16. Divorce <^ 298(1) 
Fact that father had inculcated atti-
tudes antagonistic to mother in older chil-
dren and other evidence was sufficient to 
support award of custody of three older 
children to father and three younger chil-
dren to mother m divorce proceeding. 
17. Divorce c=*299 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in decree requiring two-week notice to ar-
range visitation of children by noncustodial 
parent where, by reason of strong animosi-
ties generated over custody issu<\ require-
ment of rather formalized arrangements 
until all parties invoked had time to organ-
ize their new lifestyles and gain greater 
insight as to their problems could not be 
deemed inappropriate, interim solution. 
18. Divorce c=>310 
Trial court did not err in awarding 
child support until each child to broken 
marriage attained age of 19 where statute 
conferred power on trial court in divorce 
action to award support to age 21, and 
where trial court made special findings con-
cerning need for child support to age of 19. 
Lyle W Hillvard of Hillyard, Low & 
Anderson, Logan, for defendant and appel-
lant 
B L. Dart of Dart & Stegall, Salt Lake 
City, Bruce L. Jorgensen of Olson, Hoggan 
& Sorenson, Logan, for plaintiff and respon-
dent 
MAUGHAN, Justice. 
Defendant-husband appeals the distribu-
tion of property and custodial arrangements 
for the minor children in a decree of di-
vorce. The judgment of the trial court is 
affirmed Costs to plaintiff. All statutory 
references are to Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. 
The parties were married in June 1961, 
they are the parents of six children, who at 
the time the decree was entered in March 
1979, were the ages of 16, 15, 14, 8, 7 and 4. 
Defendant was awarded custody of the 
three older children and plaintiff was given 
custody of the three younger ones. 
At the time of marriage defendant had 
completed two years of college, and plain-
tiff was a graduate nurse. During the 
course of the marriage defendant has 
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earned bachelor's and master's degrees as 
well as taking additional classes in his spe-
cialty. At the time of trial, he was a ten-
ured associate professor of electrical engi-
neering at a state university, with a gross 
salary of $28,426, exclusive of fringe bene-
fits. In addition, defendant was a principal 
shareholder in a close corporation engaged 
in rendering professional services in his 
field. In 1978, defendant received approxi-
mately $13,275 in wages and $7,500 in loans 
from this corporation. 
Plaintiff, throughout the marriage, has 
worked as necessary to supplement the 
family income, assist in funding her hus-
band's education, or to provide a down pay-
ment on the family's real property. At the 
time of trial, plaintiff was employed half-
time as a nurse and her net earnings per 
month were approximately $613. 
In the distribution of the assets, plaintiff 
was awarded the equity in the family home, 
her automobile, some of the home furnish-
ings, and her personal belongings. The 
court found the value of this property to be 
$31,200. Plaintiff was required to assume 
and discharge a mortgage in the sum of 
$29,208 on the home. Plaintiff was award-
ed alimony in the sum of $300 per month 
for a period of 162 months, with the provi-
sion the alimony would terminate on her 
remarriage or defendant's death. Plaintiff 
was further awarded child support in the 
amount of $150 per month per child and 
$5,000 to apply towards her attorney's fees. 
Defendant was awarded assets, which the 
trial court found had the value of $63,126. 
These assets included a parcel of unim-
proved land, a new home, his automobile, 
certain items of household furniture, his 
gun collection and certain other items of 
personal property, the current value of his 
equity in a retirement fund and other in-
vestments. 
The trial of this case extended over a 
period of four days, a considerable period of 
this time was directed to the issue of custo-
dy of the six children. The plaintiffs evi-
dence indicated a calculated course of con-
duct on the part of defendant to alienate 
the children from her and to inculcate feel-
ings of animosity and contempt for her. 
Defendant denied this charge and claimed 
that as the marital relationship had disinte-
grated plaintiff had withdrawn from in-
volvement with the family, and defendant 
had merely attempted to fill the vacuum so 
that the family could continue functioning 
as an integrated unit. 
The trial court found plaintiff had in-
curred the disrespect of the children by 
reason of defendant's actions. Defendant 
had either intentionally or unwittingly in-
volved the three older children in the custo-
dy dispute between the parties; so the chil-
dren's loyalty to defendant had resulted in 
their rejection of plaintiff. However, nei-
ther parent was found unfit. The trial 
court recited its adherence to the standard 
of "the best interests of the child" in resolv-
ing the custodial issues. In its findings, the 
trial court contrasted the characters of the 
parties and found plaintiff a better example 
of honesty, morality, courtesy, and unself-
ishness. Defendant was found to have es-
tablished better communication with the 
children, but plaintiffs withdrawal was at-
tributed to the emotional distress precipi-
tated by defendant. The trial court ac-
knowledged and rejected the recommenda-
tion of the social worker that the children 
should remain together, and, because of the 
alienation of the older children towards 
their mother, the custody of the children 
should be given to th<" father. The trial 
court expressed the view the social worker 
had not considered the long range effect in 
making the recommendation, and the court 
questioned whether defendant could, in 
fact, devote sufficient time to six children 
and still meet the demands of his profes-
sion. The two younger daughters were 
found to be well adjusted in their present 
environment. Based on the foregoing fac-
tors, the older children were awarded to 
defendant and the younger children to 
plaintiff, subject to reasonable visitation 
rights in the non-custodial parent. How-
ever, the court provided the visitation must 
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be arranged by the mutual consent of the 
parties two weeks in advance. 
[1, 2] In a divorce case, even though the 
proceedings are equitable and this Court 
may review the evidence,1 this Court ac-
cords considerable deference to the findings 
and judgment of the trial court due to its 
advantageous position. On appeal this 
Court will not disturb the action of the trial 
court unless the evidence clearly preponder-
ates to the contrary, or the trial court has 
abused its discretion, or misapplied princi-
ples of law.2 In application of these pre-
cepts to the record herein there is no basis 
to interfere with the decision of the trial 
court. 
DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS 
[3,4] There is no fixed formula upon 
which to determine a division of properties, 
it is a prerogative of the court to make 
whatever disposition of property as it 
deems fair, equitable, and necessary for the 
protection and welfare of the parties.3 In 
the division of marital property, the trial 
judge has wide discretion, and his findings 
will not be disturbed unless the record indi-
cates an abuse thereof.4 
Defendant contends the trial court erred 
in including as part of the marital assets 
subject to division certain investments iden-
tified as SNI funds. These funds were 
awarded to defendant, and the sum of 
$6,000 for these investments was included 
in the calculation of defendant's total 
award. Defendant characterized these as 
educational funds for the three older chil-
dren, and claims he should be deemed as a 
I. Article VIII, Sec. 9, Constitution of Utah. 
2., Eastman v. Eastman, Utah, 558 P.2d 514 
(1976); Watson v. Watson, Utah, 561 P.2d 1072 
(1977); Pope v. Pope, Utah, 589 P.2d 752 
(1978). 
3. Pearson v. Pearson, Utah, 561 P.2d 1080 
(1977); Hamilton v. Hamilton, Utaji, 562 P.2d 
235 (1977); Naylor v. Naylor, Utah, 563 P.2d 
mere trustee to manage the funds for his 
minor children. 
[5] These funds were held solely in de-
fendant's name, and he received certain tax 
benefits incidental thereto. He made no 
attempt to transfer them to the children 
under the uniform gifts to minors provi-
sions of Section 75-5-601, et seq. His testi-
mony indicated no more than an intention 
in the future to use the funds for the chil-
dren. He retained exclusive dominion and 
controll over them. He merely indicated he 
would have no objection if the court or-
dered him to place them in trust for the 
benefit of the children. A court may not, 
under a decree of divorce, unless a child has 
an incapacity or disability, order the trans-
fer of the property of either parent to the 
children for the purpose of creating an es-
tate for their permanent benefit.5 
[6] Defendant furthe; objects to the 
valuation of his presently vested interest in 
certain retirement funds. The valuation of 
$16,939 as the current fair market value 
was presented by a witness called by de-
fendant. There was no other evidence ad-
duced as to value. The theory urged by 
defendant was not presented to the trial 
court and must be deemed untimely when it 
is first claimed on appeal. 
[7,8] Defendant contends his equity in 
a home he purchased subsequent to plain-
tiff's filing for divorce should not have been 
considered a marital asset subject to divi-
sion. Such an argument is contrary to the 
specific provisions of Section 30-3-5, 
U.C.A., 1953, and the rulings of this court in 
accordance therewith. The marital estate 
is evaluated according to the existing prop-
184 (1977); Gramme v. Gramme, Utah, 587 
P.2d 144 (1978). 
4. Jesperson v. Jesperson, Utah, 610 P.2d 326 
(1980). 
5. English v. English, Utah, 565 P.2d 409, 412 
0977). 
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erty interests at the time the marriage is 
terminated by the decree of the court.6 
Defendant argues the division of the 
marital property was inequitable by reason 
of the trial court's failure to give sufficient 
weight and consideration to the liabilities. 
During the pendency of these proceedings 
defendant purchased a home for $90,000, his 
equity therein was found by the trial court 
to be $6,500, which was awarded to him. 
By taking this liability and the total sum he 
may potentially pay as alimony, defendant 
calculates the net value distributed to him 
will be in a negative amount, while the net 
value awarded to plaintiff will be $50,624. 
(This amount is derived by adding $31,232 
of assets awarded to plaintiff to $48,600 
alimony and subtracting the mortgage of 
$29,208 on the home awarded to plaintiff.) 
Defendant urges a more equitable division 
would apportion the marital debts pro rata. 
[9-11] Significantly, defendant has not 
specifically claimed the trial court abused 
its discretion in the division of the marital 
assets, and such a claim could not be sus-
tained by the records. Furthermore, the 
award of alimony should not be included as 
a marital asset which was distributed at the 
time of divorce. As this Court observed in 
English v. English,7 there is a distinction 
between the division of assets accumulated 
during marriage, which are distributed 
upon an equitable basis, and the post mari-
tal duty of support and maintenance. The 
function of alimony is to provide support 
for the wife as nearly as possible at the 
standard of living she enjoyed during mar-
riage and to prevent the wife from becom-
ing a public charge. Criteria considered in 
determining a reasonable award of support 
include the financial conditions and needs 
of the wife, the ability of the wife to pro-
duce a sufficient income for herself, and the 
ability of the husband to provide support.8 
FLETCHER Utah 1223 
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The trial court distributed approximately 
one-third of the marital assets to plaintiff 
and two-thirds to defendant In its find-
ings the trial court stated: 
"The Court finds that in lieu of order-
ing a cash settlement with a lien on the 
Defendant's property to equalize the 
property settlement, it is reasonable to 
award the Plaintiff alimony in the sum of 
$300.00 per month for 162 months, . . 
provided, however, that said alimony is to 
terminate upon either Defendant's death 
or plaintiff's remarriage." 
The Court further found such an award 
resulted in a lower figure than would be the 
case if a cash settlement for the difference 
were imposed to be repaid at $300.00 per 
month at eight percent interest, but the 
Court also took into consideration the court 
costs and attorney's fees the defendant 
must pay. 
[12,13] The alimony awarded in this ac-
tion cannot be deemed in the nature of a 
property settlement, for it is not a sum 
certain but is terminable on certain contin-
gencies. The record in the case will sustain 
the alimony award as an appropriate sum 
for support and maintenance. Plaintiff in-
troduced into evidence a budget indicating 
family needs. (She had excluded the costs 
of real property taxes and insurance be-
cause she was unfamiliar with specific 
amounts.) Her income was limited by part-
time employment so she might give ade-
quate care and nurturing to the three 
younger children, ranging in age from four 
to eight. Defendant had sufficient income 
to provide support. The record sustains 
trial court's finding that the sum awarded 
for alimony was reasonable.9 
[14, 15] In continuation of his fallacious 
contention that there must be an equaliza-
6. Hamilton v. Hamilton, Utah, 562 P.2d 235 9. As explained in Jesperson v. Jesperson, note 
(1977); Jesperson v. Jesperson, Utah, 610 P.2d 
326 (1980). 
7. Note 5 supra, at pp. 411-412 of 565 P.2d. 
8. Also see Gramme v. Gramme, Utah, 587 P.2d 
144 (1978). 
6 supra, 610 P.2d 326, 328, this court is inclined 
to affirm a trial court's decision whenever it 
can be done on proper grounds, even though 
the trial court may have assigned an incorrect 
reason for its ruling. 
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tion of the assets, defendant argues each 
party should pay his own attorney's fees. 
This argument is without merit. As noted, 
ante, the trial court had conferred a more 
favorable adjustment of resources in consid-
eration of defendant's obligation to pay at-
torney's fees. Plaintiff has urged she be 
.awarded attorney's fees expended in de-
fending this appeal. However, in addition 
to the question as to which party prevailed 
on appeal, there are a number of factors to 
be considered in determining whether attor-
ney's fees should be awarded. Accordingly, 
as to that issue, this case is remanded to the 
trial court to determine whether an award 
of attorney's fees should be made, and if so, 
the amount thereof.10 
CUSTODIAL ARRANGEMENT AND 
CHILD SUPPORT 
Defendant contends it would have been 
in the best interest of the children to award 
the custody of all the children to him. As 
noted ante, the trial court made extensive 
findings of fact concerning the custody of 
the children and utilized as the standard in 
making its determination, the best interests 
of the children. Since the older children 
had exhibited such a deep antagonism to-
wards their mother, she expressed concern 
about compelling them to live with her. 
Defendant, whom the trial court found to 
have intentionally or unwittingly contribut-
ed to the alienation of the older children, 
now urges he is the only parent capable and 
willing to assume the custody of the six 
children. 
[16] The potential damage defendant 
has wrought by his course of conduct can-
not be underestimated, and it cannot be 
deemed to be in the best interests of the 
children to grant their custody to one who 
has inculcated the attitudes exhibited by 
the older children. The record and findings 
10. Ehninger v. Ehninger, Utah, 569 P.2d 1104 
(1977). 
,* 
11. Cox v. Cox, Utah, 532 P.2d 994 (1975). 
indicate plaintiff would be the superior cus-
todial parent. The trial court faced the 
dilemma of compelling three teenagers 
against their will to live with their mother. 
To avoid further conflict and the potential 
of further exacerbating the unfortunate di-
vision in this tragic family, the custody of 
the older children was granted to defend-
ant. Both the trial court and plaintiff ex-
hibited wisdom in making this difficult 
choice, and there is no basis for this Court 
to intervene. This Court will not upset the 
trial court's judgment in custodial matters 
unless it is persuasively shown to te con-
trary to the best interests and welfare of 
the children and family.11 
[17] Defendant contends the provision 
in the decree requiring a two-week notice to 
arrange visitation constituted a clear abuse 
of discretion by the trial court. This provi-
so is not engraved in stone and is subject to 
modification as are all custodial arrange-
ments. By reason of the strong animosities 
generated over the custody issue, the re-
quirement of rather formalized arrange-
ments until all the parties involved have 
had time to organize their new life-styles 
and gain greater insight as to their prob-
lems, cannot be deemed an inappropriate, 
interim solution. 
[18] Finally, defendant contends the tri-
al court erred in awarding child support 
until each child attains the age of nineteen. 
Section 15-2-1, confers power on the trial 
court in a divorce action to award support 
to age twenty-one. This Court has ruled 
the trial court must make a special finding 
to justify such an order.12 In adherence 
with this standard the trial court made a 
special finding concerning the need for 
child support to the age of nineteen. Thus, 
defendant's claim is without merit. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and HALL, WILKINS 
and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
12. Harris v. Harris, Utah, 585 P.2d 435 (1978); 
Carlson v. Carlson, Utah, 584 P.2d 864 (1978); 
Ferguson v. Ferguson, Utah, 578 P.2d 1274 
(1978). 
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the defendant failed to refer to any portion 
of the record that factually supports his 
contentions on appeal. This Court will as-
sume the correctness of the judgment below 
if counsel on appeal does not comply with 
the requirements of Rule 75(p)(2)(2)(d), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as to making 
a concise statement of facts and citation of 
the pages in the record where they are 
supported.4 
The judgment is affirmed. 
O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
Mary Ruth HASLAM, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
James Vincent HASLAM, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 18013. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 31, 1982. 
Former husband appealed from an or-
der of the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, G. Hal Taylor, J., dismissing his 
motion to terminate alimony. The Su-
preme Court, Stewart, J., held that there 
was substantial change in circumstances 
warranting modification of the alimony 
award where, since the divorce, former wife 
had obtained employment, experienced a 
substantial increase in income, and accumu-
lated some savings, while former husband 
had retired and received income in approxi-
mately the same amount as he received at 
the time of the divorce some 17 years previ-
ously. 
Reversed and remanded, * 
4. Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, 121 Utah 359, 242 
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1. Divorce <3=>164 
Party seeking modification of divorce 
decree must demonstrate substantial 
change of circumstances. U.C.A. 1953, 30-
3-5. 
2. Divorce <3=>164 
Change in circumstances required to 
justify modification of divorce decree varies 
with type of modification sought. U.C.A. 
1953, 30-3-5. 
3. Divorce c=> 245(2) 
There was substantial change in cir-
cumstances warranting modification of ali-
mony award where, since divorce, former 
wife had obtained employment, experienced 
substantial increase in income, and accumu-
lated some savings, while former husband 
had retired and received income in approxi-
mately the same amount as he received at 
time of divorce some 17 years previously. 
U.C.A. 1953, 30-3-5. 
Leland S. McCullough, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant. 
Mar}r Ruth Haslam, pro se. 
STEWART, Justice: 
The issue in this case is whether the trial 
court erred in dismissing defendant's mo-
tion to terminate alimony on the ground 
that the defendant had failed to demon-
strate a "change of circumstances" suffi-
cient to warrant termination. 
In 1945 the parties were married and 
subsequently had two children. In 1966 the 
plaintiff obtained a divorce and upon an 
agreement between the parties an order 
was entered directing the defendant to pay 
$200 a month alimony plus child support. 
The child support has since then terminated 
by virtue of the children's reaching their 
majority. At the time of the divorce, de-
fendant earned between $1000 and $1200 
per month, and the plaintiff was unem-
ployed. 
In 1972, some six years after the divorce, 
the defendant remarried, and in 1980 he 
P.2d 297 (1952). 
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retired. The trial court found that at the 
time of the hearing defendant's health and 
age did not permit him to work. The de-
fendant now receives Social Security in the 
amount of $532.80, pension benefits in the 
amount of $618.09, and approximately $100 
from stock dividends, for a total of 
$1,250.89. He receives an additional $229 
from Social Security for his present wife 
and $229 for her minor child by a former 
husband. The household income therefore 
totals $1,708.89 and expenses total 
$1,607.83. 
Plaintiff, subsequent to the divorce, se-
cured a job and now earns $1,100 per 
month. In addition to the $200 alimony, 
she draws interest from $12,000 in savings. 
She has not remarried and claims expenses 
in the amount of $1,606. The trial court 
dismissed defendant's petition for a modifi-
cation, finding that there had been no ma-
terial change of circumstances. 
Defendant's contention is that his income 
is approximately the same as it was in 1966, 
and the plaintiff's income has increased 
dramatically. He argues that it is unfair to 
require him to supplement the plaintiff's 
income when she has about the same in-
come as he does and no dependents. 
[1, 2] The district court has "continuing 
jurisdiction" in divorce cases "to make such 
subsequent changes or new orders with re-
spect to the support and maintenance of the 
parties . . . as shall be reasonable and nec-
essary." U.C.A., 1953, § 30-3-5. To pro-
vide some stability to decrees, however, and 
to prevent an inundation of the courts with 
petitions for modification, a party seeking a 
modification must demonstrate a substan-
tial change of circumstances. E.g., Adams 
v. Adams, Utah, 593 P.2d 147 (1979). The 
change in circumstances required to justify 
a modification of a divorce decree varies 
with the type of modification sought. 
Foulger v. Foulger, Utah, 626 P.2d 412 
(1981). As to cases involving a petition to 
change the custody of children, see Hogge 
v. Hogge, Utah, 649 P.2d 51 (1982). As to 
changes in the disposition of real property, 
see Despain v. Despain, Utah, 610 P.2d 1303 
(1980); Land v. Land, Utah, 605 P.2d 1248 
(1980). 
With respect to modifying alimony, this 
Court has recently stated that "provisions 
in the original decree of divorce granting 
alimony, child support, and the like must be 
readily susceptible to alteration at a later 
date, as the needs which such provisions 
were designed to fill are subject to rapid 
and unpredictable change." Foulger v. 
Foulger, Utah, 626 P.2d 412 (1981). 
[3] On the instant facts it is clear that 
there has been a substantial change in cir-
cumstances. Since the divorce, the former 
Mrs. Haslam has obtained employment, ex-
perienced a substantial increase in income 
and has accumulated some savings. Mr. 
Haslam has retired and presently receives 
income in approximately the same amount 
as he received at the time of the divorce 
some seventeen years ago. 
Under the circumstances of this case, we 
think that the combination of the support-
ing spouse's retirement, together with the 
dependent spouse's employment, earning of 
a substantial income, and accumulation of 
substantial savings subsequent to the origi-
nal divorce decree, constitutes a substantial 
change of circumstances. See Lepis v. Lep-
is, 83 N.J. 139, 416 A.2d 45 (1980), and cases 
cited. Therefore, defendant's petition for 
modification is reinstated and the case re-
manded so that the trial court may consider 
whether the alimony award should be modi-
fied as equity requires under the circum-
stances. 
Reversed and remanded. Costs to re-
spondent. 
HALL, C.J., and OAKS, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
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Sharon Mae DAVIS, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Charles Francis DAVIS, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 18077. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 22, 1982. 
Husband appealed from a decree of 
divorce entered by the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, G. Ha! Taylor, J., chal-
lenging the property division. The Su-
preme Court, Howe, J., held that: (1) finan-
cial arrangement on marital home, award-
ing husband one half of equity in property 
at time of trial plus one half of any increase 
accruing in future due to inflation but fail-
ing to provide husband any interest in in-
creased equity in house which would result 
by virtue of his paying alimony designed to 
cover amount of second mortgage payment, 
was inequitable, and (2) award of one third 
of out-of-state property, acquired by hus-
band prior to marriage but paid for, in part, 
from joint account during marriage, to wife 
and two-thirds to husband was within am-
bit of trial court's discretion. 
Remanded. 
1. Divorce <s» 252.5(1) 
Divorce decree's financial arrangement 
on marital home, which awarded husband 
one half of equity in property at time of 
trial plus one half of any increase accruing 
in future due to inflation but failed to 
provide him any interest in increased equity 
in house which would result by virtue of his 
paying alimony designed to cover amount 
of second mortgage payment, was inequita-
ble where, when amount of life insurance 
premiums and interest on second mortgage 
balance were added to mortgage balance, 
husband would be required to make postde-
cree payments totalling amount nearly dou-
ble equity awarded him, all proceeds of 
second mortgage loan went into improve-
ment of house, and husband had no right to 
possession. 
2. Divorce o=>252.3(3) 
Divorce award of one third of out-of-
state property, acquired by husband prior to 
marriage but paid for, in part, from joint 
account during marriage, to wife and two-
thirds to husband was within ambit of trial 
court's discretion, notwithstanding that 
three fourths of purchase price was paid 
prior to marriage. 
Henry S. Nygaard, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant. 
Paul H. Liapis, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff and respondent. 
HOWE, Justice: 
This is an appeal by the defendant 
Charles Francis Davis from a decree of 
divorce entered in an action brought 
against, him by his wife, Sharon Mae Davis, 
plaintiff. He challenges the division of 
property made by the trial court. 
The parties were married on March 5, 
1974. Both had been previously married. 
Plaintiff gave up a $150 per month alimony 
award from her previous divorce when she 
married the. defendant. The plaintiff had 
three children by her first marriage and 
she, the children and the defendant lived 
together in a house which she owned at the 
time of her marriage to the defendant. 
The plaintiff was employed during the last 
two years of the marriage and at the time 
of trial was earning $687 net per month. 
She also received child support from her 
former husband. 
No children were born to the parties. 
During the six years they lived together 
they expended substantial amounts of mon-
ey to improve the house. The defendant 
paid the plaintiffs former husband $1,300 
to satisfy a lien he held on the property. 
Although the plaintiff disputed it, he 
claimed that he further invested in it mon-
ey which he had received as an inheritance 
from his mother's estate, as well as money 
he received from a personal injury settle-
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ment. There is no dispute that shortly be-
fore the separation of the parties they 
obtained a second mortgage loan to remodel 
part of the house and to make an addition 
of 450 square feet. The balance on that 
mortgage at the time of trial was $15,-
876.27. The monthly payments v/ere $345. 
Prior to their marriage, the defendant in 
1967 purchased under contract four one-half 
acre lots in New Mexico for $6,200. Three-
fourths of that price was paid prior to the 
marriage in 1974 and the balance of the 
contract was paid from their joint account 
during the marriage. 
The trial court apparently concluded 
from the evidence that the equity of the 
parties in the house had increased $23,000 
during the marriage. It awarded the de-
fendant one-half of that equity ($11,500) 
plus one-half of any increase which may 
accrue in the future due to inflation and 
made that award payable when the plain-
tiff remarried, sold the property or her 
youngest child attained the age of 18 years. 
The court further ordered the defendant to 
pay to the plaintiff $420 per month alimony 
until such time as the second mortgage had 
been paid in full, and ordered that he main-
tain sufficient insurance on his life to in-
sure payment of the mortgage balance in 
the event of his death. An order was made 
that the parties sell the New Mexico lots 
and divide the proceeds between them as 
follows: One-third to plaintiff and two-
thirds to defendant. 
The defendant's main contention is that 
it was inequitable for the trial court to deny 
him any interest in the increased equity in 
the house which will result by virtue of his 
paying alimony designed to cover the 
amount of the second mortgage payment. 
Defendant refers us to the Conclusions of 
Law in which the trial judge took the 
monthly payment on the second mortgage 
of $345 and added to it $75 for the general 
support of the plaintiff, and then ordered 
the defendant to pay a total of $420 each 
month to her, terming it alimony. 
[1] We agree that,, this financial ar-
rangement on the house was inequitable. 
The trial court properly awarded the de-
. DAVIS Utah 673 
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fendant one-half of the equity in the prop-
erty at the time of trial plus one-half of any 
increase accruing in the future due to infla-
tion. It wisely provided that such equity 
should not be payable to the defendant un-
til plaintiff shoulu remarry, sell the proper-
ty, or until her youngest child attained the 
age of 18 years. This provision assured the 
plaintiff and her children a place to live. 
But after having done that, the trial court 
upset the equicy of that division by requir-
ing the defendant to make a further sub-
stantial investment in the property without 
any corresponding benefit to him. When 
the amount of the life insurance premiums 
and the interest on the second mortgage 
balance are added to the mortgage balance, 
the defendant will be required to make post 
decree payments totalling an amount nearly 
double the equity awarded to him. This 
was unfair to him and weighted the division 
of the property heavily in the plaintiffs 
favor. Fairness dictates that he should re-
alize something out of the increased equity 
which will result from his providing the 
funds to retire the second mortgage. The 
unfairness is evident when it is considered 
that all the proceeds of the second mort-
gage loan went into the improvement of the 
house. Also, he has no right to possession. 
It should also be noted that he was ordered 
to pay approximately $9,000 of debts and 
$1,000 attorney's fees for his wife. The 
decree should be amended to allow the de-
fendant's participation to the extent of one-
half in the increased equity brought about 
by the reduction of or retirement of the 
second mortgage. 
[2] We find no error in the division of 
the New Mexico property. Although it was 
contracted for and partially paid for prior 
to the marriage, a substantial number of 
the monthly payments were made after the 
marriage. We find it to be within the 
ambit of discretion of the trial court to 
award the plaintiff one-third of that prop-
erty and two-thirds to the defendant. 
Remanded to the trial court to amend the 
decree in conformance with this opinion. 
Each party to bear his or her own costs. 
HALL, C.J, and STEWART, OAKS and 
DURHAM, J J., concur. 
